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INTRODUCTION 
In the last decade, cognitive-behavioral theories of depression 
have increasingly incorporated both cognitive and environmental para-
meters to account for the complex symptomology present in depressive 
disorders. These. theories place primary emphasis on the role of c.ogni-
tions in determining emotions; that is, one's beliefs about events are 
seen as ce.ntral to depressive emotions. Considerable research supports 
these contentions. 
Recent research by Gordon Bower (1981) provides additional data 
concerning the relationship between emotion and cognition. Bower sug-
gc:sts that emotion serves as a memory unit that enters into associatio1i.s 
with coincident events. Activation of this emotion aids in retrieval. 
of events associated with it and primes themes for other cognitive pro-
cesses. In the group of studies associated with this theory, Bower has 
obtained significant results relating hypnotically-induced emotions-and 
cognitive processes. 
Hhile Bov1er' s research has significant implications for theories 
of depression, two questions arise from this research. The first con-
cerns demand compliances resulting from the hypnotic manipulations. 
Although Bower has defended this criticism with related research, addi-
tiorial studies should be carried out. A second question is related to 
the generalizability of Bower's results. The generalizability of these 
1 
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results may be evidenced if research in naturalistic settings also found 
a relationship between emotions and cognitive processes. Partial re-
plications in normal or clinical settings might adequately demonstrate 
the relevance of Bm-1er' s findings in a clinical setting. 
The following project was designed to expand upon Bm-1er's research 
and study various degrees of unmanipulated (naturally-occurring) depres-
sion in a normal population. Specifically, the relationship of various 
levels of depression and word associations, the content of affect-laden 
word recall, the amount of total recall, the amount and affect of inter-
jections, and the ordering of recall were observed. 
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
Introduction 
Philosophers have related affect and cognitions for 2000 years. 
Kant suggested that reason synthesizes experiences according to its own 
nature and our understanding of the outside world is possible only in 
terms of our modes of perception. Kant's philosophy maintained that the 
lm.;s of man rietermined v1hat laws of nature can be discovered. Dynamic 
theorists have also addressed the issue of the relationship between af-
fect and cognitions for nearly 90 years (James, 1890; McDougall, 1921); 
In the last decade cognition and affect have again become major areas 
of theory and research in depression following several years of inaeti-
vity due to the popularity of strict behaviorism and its extreme stimu-
lus-response approach. One reason some researchers have returned to 
studying cognition is that many responses are not predictable from the 
stimulus situation alone. Cognitive events intervene between the two 
tc sufficiently warrant attention. In this short time, some theorists 
have come to vietv affective states from both operant and cognitive terms. 
The following sections will be devoted to contemporary theories 
and relevant issues about depression as viewed by cognitive-behavioral 
researchers. First, three ways of classifying depression will be de-
fined. Next, an extended view of the cognitive determinants of depres-
sion t,Jill be presented. Regarding this theme, several researchers have 
proposed that depressed people interpret their world and themselves 
3 
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differently than nondepressives (Beck, 1972; Ferster, 1974; Rehm, Note l; 
Seligman, 1975). Recent research by Bower (1981) suggests that emotions 
pm.;rerfully influence specific cognitive processes through an associative 
network process. 
In summary, this review intends to show the increasing use of cog-
nitive explanations to depressive behavior. Specific attention will be 
given to research relating depression to selective attention, memory, 
and associations. 
' __./'/Researchers classify and define depression in a variety of \-rays 
I 
' from a simple mood state to a complex syndrome consisting of behavioral, 
cogniti~e, affective, and physiological parameters (Becker, 1974). In 
general, these classifications fall into three groups (Roth, 1977): 
qualitative classifications, dimensional or trait classifications, and 
\ 
\.~' (The first group of classifications consists of theorists who have 
cognitive-behavioral classifications. 
cldo~ted a symptom cluster model and propose "qualitatively" distinct 
types of depression. Types of depression are differentiated on the 
basis of symptomology, etiology, response to treatment and background 
factors (age, family history, etc.)-~·7 In the past, one of the most fre-
quently used nosological systems was the American Psychiatric Associa-: 
;.-/ 
tion Diagnostic Criteria (DSM II, 1968).i The seven depressive syndromes 
u· 
cited \>Jere: psy(~hiatric depressi\,e reaction, ·manic depression--depres-
sed typ0; manic depression-manic type; manic depression-circular type; 
involutional depression, neurotic depressive reactions, and cyclothymic 
5 
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personality. (Each subtype was differentiated from the other on the · 
basis of etiological and/or symptomatic factors. For instance, both 
psychotic and neurotic depressive reactions were thought to be precipi-
tated by environmental stresses while the remaining subtypes were re-
lated t(> physiological, constitutional, and genetic variables. Similar-
ly, mB.nic-depressive patterns were discriminated from involutional-
depression on the basis of past symptoms, and from cyclothymia on the 
basis of symptom severity. 
1 Recently, the diagnostic criteria were revised (DSM III, 1980). 
I 
\. 
The revision lists the following depressive syndromes: major depres-
sion, single episode; major depression, recurrent; bi-polar disorder, 
mixed; bi-polar disorder, manic; bi-polar disorder, depressed; cyclo-
thymic, and depressive neurosis. Each subtype is differentiated from 
the other on the basis of three axes: clinical syndromes, personality 
........ 
and developmental disorders,arrl physical disorders and condition.~d In 
addition to those distinctions, a clinician can also use two additional 
supplement uiagncses: severity of psychosocial'stressors and highest 
level of adaptive functioning in the past year. 
Ar.other proponent of the qualitative classification of depres-
is idnoker and his associates (1970) who have differentiated sub..,. 
types of depression in terms of depressive symptoms and the presence 
of other psychiatric disorders. He has made distinctions between ~rief 
reactions, primary affectiv~ disturbance and secondary affective dis~~ 
turbanc.e. ~-·grief rea~·· tion is eonsiderec a loss induced, transient 
!--' 
depressive episode. A diagnosis of primary affective reaction is given 
6 
if the client has no other psychiatric disorder, and secondary ~ffective 
reaction is indicated when a preexisting psychiatric dysfunction was 
~ --; 
evident. \ Winoker further divides primary affective reactions into uni-
) _A 
polar subgroups along a similar line of thinking./ 
i 
Another type of qualitative classification of depression is em-
/ ... ~ ~ 
played through sophisticated statistical instruments{ Cluster analysE~§ ____ _ 
' ________ ., ... -·------------ ~ 
(Everitt, 1.972) and factor analytic procedures (Fleiss, Lawlor, Platman, 
and Fieve, 1971) have been used to isolate qualitatively distinct types 
and subtypes of dcpressio;;_-·7 Grinker, Miller, Sabashin, Nunn, and 
Nunally (1961) performed onk of the earliest factor analytic studies of 
depression. The resulting types were: empty depression, angry depres-
sian, hypochondriacal depression, and anxiety depression. Friedman, 
Cowitz, Cohen and Granick (1963) isolated subtypes similar to that of 
Grinker et al., (1961). 
The second group of classifications conceptualizing depression 
as a family of disorders, each of \vhich differs with regard to the 
severity nr intensity of experienced symptomologyi This type of classi-
fication is called the "dimensional" or "trait" conceptualization of 
depression. Unlike type theorists, a trait theorist does not view de-
pret;sio·a as encompassing a variety of qualitatively distinct syndromes. 
Distinct syndromes may exist but they are viewed as being reduceable 
1ic, a finite number of corrnuon dimensions in which individual differences 
are best rcpreser<ted as gradations along a single dimension (unidimen·-
sional sys rem), or along a combination of several dimensions (rnul ti ·-
dimensiouol systern)1 A second assumption of this approach to dassi-
7 
fication is that the nature of the depression has a basic underlying 
feature, that is, a client is seen as "generally depressed." It is 
also assumed that the depression is a covariation of one or more of 
discrete symptoms (or traits) which are obtained by conventional factor 
analytic procedures. Since a trait is independent, a high score on one 
gives a researcher little or no information about any remaining traits. 
Variation in blends among the basic traits accounts for the variability 
of clinical depressions (Rosenthal and Gudeman, 1967). 
A variety of unidimensional systems have been derived. For ex--
ample, Klerman (1971) and Zubin and Fleiss (1971) state that psychotic 
and neurotic depressions are not qualitatively distinct and only differ 
in regard to symptom intensity. Similarity, Kendell (1968) and Kendell 
and Gourlay (1970) suggest that the traditional endogenous-reacttve · 
dichotomy (Hamilton and \Vhite, 1959; Kiloh and Garside, 1963) may in-
stead be symptom clusters occupying opposing ends of a single depressive 
trait. 
Multidimensional trait systel!lS are common in the field. The vari-
ety may in part be attributed to use of different subject populations 
(inpatient, outpatient, college students) and different measures of de-
presrdoa (l'iXPI-D, Beck Depression Inventory, Nul tiple Depression Inven-
tory). The common theme contained in all these multidimensional systems 
ir; that underlying all depressive states is a "general" depressive 
disorder containing several "group" or "specific" factors. 
Perhaps the most investigated multidimensional system is that of 
8 
endogenous-reactive depression. Traditionally, reactive depression \vas 
thought to be environmentally precipitated while endogenous depression 
was linked to internal physiological causes. Trait theorists have re-
ported symptomatic differences. For instance, Kiloh and Garside (1963) 
evaluated 92 clinically diagnosed "endogenous" or "reactive" subjects 
on 35 measures (age, previous attacks, etc.). T\vo factors accounted 
for a large portion of the variance, a "general" depression factor and· 
a bi-polar factor related to the endogenous-reactive dichotomy. Speci-
fie symptoms such as self pity, existence of a precipitant, inadequacy, 
initial insownia, depression worse in the morning, agitation, obesses-
sions, hypochondriacal complaints, etc. were related to the reactive 
end of the rlimension. Other symptoms such as early morning awakening, 
depression worse in the evening, onset in fourth decade of life, etc. 
were loaded on the endogenous end of the dimension. Similar patterns 
have been found by other researchers (Hamilton and White, 1959; Carney, 
Roth, and Garside, 1965; Kiloh, Andre>Ys, Nielson, and Bianchi, 1972; 
Mendels and Cochrane, 1968). 
T The third major way of classifying depression does so in terms of 
the frequency of occurrence of specific behaviors, thoughts, and physio-
logicat symptoms. This is referred to as the cognitive-behavioral 
classificatio·n of depression1 These theorists assume that no t\vO de-
pressions are identical; each comprise a unique set of deficits and ex-
cesses. No assumptions are made about covariation among depressive 
symptoms. That is, the vppearanc.e of one symptom does not suggest cer-
tain others are expected. Ferster (1973, 1974) was one of the first 
9 
behaviorists to advance this position when he viewed depression as in-
volving a reduced frequency of "adjustive behaviors," an increased fre-
quency of avoidance and escape responses, and a passive behavioral mode 
of controlling one's environment. Variations of the basic behavioral 
framework attributing varying degrees of importance to the cognitive 
component in depression have been advanced by a number of other research-
ers (Beck, 1972; Rehm, 1977; Seligman, 1974, 1975; Williams, Barlow, 
and Agros, 1972). It is important to note that all of the theories in 
this classification of depression in some way implicate cognitions. -In 
some, the cognitive alterations are vie~·red as symptoms while in others 
they are central to depression. The folloHing sections will be devoted 
to contemporary cognitive-behavioral theories providing frameworks from 
which one can expla.i.n both overt-motoric symptomology and verbal-cogni-
tive syrnptornology. Both environmental and cognitive parameters are con-
sidered causal factors. 
Cognitive-Behavioral }Iodels of Depression 
This section is an elaboration of the previously described ''cog-
nitive-behavioral" classification of depression. As stated before, 
theories in this classification of depression incorporate both environ-
mental and cognitive factors of causality to different degrees. First, 
theories heavily weighing the environmental causes of depression will 
be revie~ved. The remaining cognitive-behavioral theories of depression 
will be reviewed in order of increasing prominence of the cognitive 
factor. 
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_!)ehavioral Perspectives. A number of theorists have suggested that 
depression is related to an insufficient amount of reinforcement (Lazarus, 
1968; Liberman and Raskin, 1971; Lewinsohn, 1974, 1975; Ferster, 1974; 
Coyne, 1976). Lev1:Lnsohn and his colleagues (1974) have developed a 
model of depression which best represents this viewpoint. Classical 
and operant conditioning processes are both involved in their frame\.JOrk. 
Specifically, a low rate of response contingent reinforcements acts as 
an unconditional stimulus eliciting a variety of depressive symptoms 
(verbal statements of dysphoria, self depreciation, rejection, guilt, 
fatigue, sleeplessness, loss of appetite, headaches, etc.). Once eli-
cited, these symptoms are maintained in an operant fashion through social 
reinforcement (sympathy). A low rate of reinforcement places the de-
pressed person on a extinction schedule. Other depressive response 
patterns are subsequently developed and maintained i.e., the behaviors 
cause the depressed person to be avoided, the individual receives less 
reinforcement, and continues to behave in depressed ways. 
Lewinsohn argues that obtained reinforcement is a function of: 
(a) the number of events Hhich an individual finds potentially rein-
forcing; (b) the number of potential reinforcers available; and (c) the 
individual's ability to obtain available reinforcers (1974, p. 158). 
Lewinsohn has primarily examined the relationship between depression 
and low rates of response contingent positive reinforcement. The dif-
ferential amounts of reinforcement \.;hic:h depressed clients and their 
families obtain has been systematically evaluated. Using a verbal in-
teraction coding system, Le\.;insohn and Shm,; (1969) found that a minimal 
11 
amount of time \vas spent discussing topics which Here reinforcing to the 
depressed client relative to the time spent on topics reinforcing to 
the spouse. Similar results Here found in a number of naturalistic set-
tings (Martin, Heinstein, and LeHinsohn, Note 2; LeHinsohn and AtHood, 
1969; Lewinsohn and Shaffer, 1971). 
In more rigorously controlled investigations, the emphasis remained 
on the covariation of mood and reinforcing activity. LeHinsohn and 
Libet (1972) examined depressed patients, nondepressed psychiatric con-
trols, and normal controls and found a significant correlation betHeen. 
their mood (Depression Adjective Checklist, 1965) and the number of plea-
sant activities in 1.ihich they engaged (MacPhillany and LeHinsohn Pleasant 
Events Schedule, 1971). The results of this study Here replicated by 
LeHinsohn and Graf (1973). In a similar procedure, MacPhillany and 
Lewinsohn (1974) found that depressives reported distinct types of acti-
vities over the s2me period as controls. \.fuen all subjects rated the 
Pleasant Events Schedule items in terms of the reinforeing value, de-
pressives' ratings Here significantly lmver than those of nondepressives. 
This supports LeHinsohn' s contention that depressives experience fe,·ler 
events or activities as potentially reinforcing. 
Other researchers have reported findings to support this framework. 
Wener and Rehm (1975) found that individuals receiving lo\v levels of 
reinLJrcement became more depres~>ed than individuals receiving high 
amounts of reinforcement. Lazarus (1968)~ Liberman and Raskin (1971), 
HcrsLn, Eisler, Alford and Agras (1973), and McLean, Ogston, and Grauer 
12 
(1973) have reported that they have treated clients with low levelG of 
reinforcement. Improvement in all of these cases was correlated with 
obtaining more reinforcement. Finally, a number of investigators have 
found depression to covary with the occurrence of "life stressors" 
(events \vh:ich a behaviorist would designate as losses of actual or po-
tential reinforcement). Paykel, Meyers, Dienelt, IClerman, Lindenthal, 
and Pepper (1969) found that within the six month period prior to in-
tervie\vS, depressives experienced signficantly more losses (marital, 
occupational, social, familial, etc.) than the controls. The results 
were essentially replicated by Leff, Roatch, and Bunney (1970) \vho ex-
amined endogenous and non-endogenous inpatients. 
Le\·linsohn has suggested that inadequate social skills may partial-
ly account for the depressive's infrequent receipt of reinforcement. 
This relationship has been assessed in group (Lewinsohn, Heinstein, and 
Alper, 1970; Libet and Lewinsohn, 1973), familial (Shaffer and Lew·insohn, 
Note 3), and laboratory contexts (Stewart, Note 4; Rosenberry, Heiss, 
and Lewinsohn, Note 5). Several findings emerged. Rosenberry et al., 
(Note 5) found that depressed. subjects Here less predictable and homo-
genous in emitting rapport-inducing and supportive communications. 
Libet and Lewinsohn (1973) found that depressives engage in fewer acti~ 
vitic:s, emit proportionately less reinforcers, communicate with a more 
restricted range of individuals, and take a longer time to respond to a 
veroalization. Steward (Note 4) also found depressives to react slov7er 
to verbal and non-verbal prompts than nondepressives. 
13 
All together, rather extensive data has been collected to support 
LeHinsohn's hypothesis that depression is linked to low rates of response 
contingent positive reinforcement. However, this model is unable to ac-
count for all the complexities of depressive responses. In particular 
it can be argued that depression is not directly related to low rates of 
reinforcement but instead to cognitive processes which mediate between 
the activity and the cognitive symptomology (Rush, Khatami, .and Beck, 
1975). It could also be that depressives do not attend to or remember 
pleasant events and are minimally affected by their occurrence. These 
possibilities will be studied in a later section. 
A second theoretical perspective which strongly lJeighs the environ-
mental Ce>Bponent in depression is exemplified by Ferster (1966, 1973, 
1974). Ferster's conceptual position on depression appears to be a link 
bet,veen the environmentally and cognitively oriented theories. Coming 
from a radical behaviorist persuasion, Ferster studied both descriptive 
and ft:n:::tional aspects of depression. The description of depressive 
disorders is seen as consisting of both behavioral deficits and excess-
es. D.sfic.i.ts are defined as a reduced frequency of normal activities 
(l97L;, p. 31). "Frequency reduction" refers to rate and quantity al-
terations as well as occurrence and nonoccurrence of certain behaviors. 
Behavioral excesses are related to deficit conditions for instance 
~vhen a C(n~mlsive A.ct:.ivity appears Hhen normal problem solving behaviors 
are no l:)Pger emitted. 
Fu~;ct irmally, depression is assumed to be related to loss of ir.1-
14 
portant discriminative stimuli, certain reinforcement schedules, aver-
sive environmental influences, and cognitive distortions. More specifi-
cally, Ferster contends that depression is apt to be precipitated by the 
loss of a source of reinforcement or stimuli leading one to emit posi-
tive behaviors (death of a spouse, loss of a friend, moving to another 
city, change of job, etc.). Lazarus (1968) suggested that the outcome 
of such a loss is related to the individual's overall availability of 
reinforcers. 
F'erster also smv certain intermittent sl:'.hedules of reinforcement 
as precipitants of depressive reactions. From animal studies, certain 
fixed schedules of reinforcement providing small gains for a large be-· 
havioral expenditure results in a lmo1er rate of responding. The lmvest 
rate of behavior is seen immediately after reinforcement is adnlinlstered. 
Depressed individuals often spend a great deal of effort in avoid-
ing being punished by decreasing engagement in aversive behaviors. 
Ferster (1973) suggests that this decreased belaavior leads to further 
depression since "it commits such a large part of a person's repertoire 
to activities th.=tt do not prodttce positive reinforcement " (p. 86 7). 
Ferster (1973, 1974) goes beyond a strict stimulus-respo:1se ex-
planation of depression however, to suggest that the individual's per-
ceptLon of the \vorld affects his receiving of rei.nforc.ernent. Hore 
specifically, he speculates that the depressive has n limited view of 
the ~vorld and has difficulty disc:lminating among different cnvirol'mcr~tal 
stimuli. Because of these discrimination difficultie~ the Jepressive 
15 
is apt to emit a response inappropriate to the situation and be punished. 
An example might be that a depressive considers home, work, and a party 
all appropriate places to engage in depressive behaviors. People at a 
gala party may consider his strange behavior, avoid the individual, and 
shut off another source of reinforcement. Only partially recognizing 
that punishment is contingent on the inappropriate behavio~ the depres-
sive acquires a "lousy vie\v of the world" (Ferster, 1973, 1974). The 
environment is thought of as providing limited support, pleasure, and 
much distress and unhappiness. 
In summary, both Lewinsohn and Ferster expouse behavioral theories 
of depression. F(~rster 's approach has to a greater extent than Le1;11insohn' s 
attempted to relate depression to both cognitive and environmental para-
meters. He suggests that a one to one relationship bet'l.veen environmental 
stimuli and depressive response does not exist and one must take into 
account the non-observable cognitive processes which mediate. 
-~nitive-Behavioral Perspective_. On the basis of small animal 
analogue research, Seligman and his colleagues have developed a cog-
nitive model of reactive depression in humans. The major construct 
utilized by this group is called "learned helplessness." Learned help·-
lessne.ss vie-.;.1s depression as resulting from cognitions of response-
outcome independence: that is, beliefs that consequences are independ-
ent of behavior. 
Recently, Abramson, Seligman, and Teasdale (1978) reformulated 
the learned helplessness model of depression. The reformulation 
16 
·recognizes the importance of attributions in predicting reactions to un-
controllable outcomes. Attributions, i.e., explanations for events, may 
be stable or unstable, global or specific, and internal or external 
attributions of cause. The type of attribution chosen influences whether 
the future helplessness will be chronic or acute, broad or narrow, and 
whether helplessness will lower self-esteem or not. Seligman further 
stated that individual differences in attributional style probably exist 
and those who typically attribute failure to global, stable and internal 
factors are most prone to general and chronic helplessness depressions 
\vith low self-esteem. 
Two pieces of research are particularly relevant in highlighting 
the role of cognitive factors in the development of learned helplessness 
patterns of behaviors. Hirota and Seligman (1975) found that uncontrol-
lable experiences on amotoric task adversely affected performance on a 
cognitive task and vice-versa. The transfer of learned helplessness 
experiences is seen as providing support for cognitions concerning re-
sponse-reinforcement independence. Additional support for the cognitive 
interpretation comes from research directly manipulating the instruction-
al set (Miller and Seligman, 1973; Hirota, 1974; Miller and Seligman, 
197.5). In particular, performance on a task Has found to vary according 
to \vhether a subject was informed that the outcome is related to chanc.e 
or skill. Similar effects are found for a chance instructional set 
and an actual helplessness experience (Hirota, 1974). Again, these are 
taken as support of mediating cogni.tions. In the instructional set 
paradigm the subject is "given" the cognitive pattern vhile in the actual 
17 
learned helplessness situation the cognition is "learned" or "created" 
by the subject. 
Additional research has shown that the cognitive changes produced 
in learned helplessness experiences are accompanied by a host of behavior-
al response patterns. First, helpless subjects behave less aggressively 
and less competitively than non-helpless subjects (Powell and Creer, 
1969; }fuier, Anderson, and Liberman, 1972). Passivity and retarded asso-
ciativity are more prominent after time (Overmier and Seligman, 1967; 
Overmier, 1968). Also, uncontrollable traumatic experiences are thought 
to precipitate some physical and physiological dysfunctions. Weight loss, 
anorexia and norephineprine depletion have all been cited (Weiss, 1968; 
Miller and Weiss, 1969; Weiss, Stone, and Harrell, 1970). 
Seligman draw parallels between learned helplessness and depression 
in areas of etiology and symptomology. Symptomatically, Seligman only 
draws parallels to reactive depressions consisting of: passivity, ne-
gative expectations, lack of aggression, dissipation in time, and also 
parallels weight loss, anorexia, and norephinephrine depletion (Seligman, 
1974). The etiology of a depressive episode is like learned helpless-
ness in that it is highlighted by the uncontrollability of reinforcement 
(Teasdale, 1978). The cognitions need not be accurate (Seligman, 197!•, 
1975). Aging, death of a loved one, loss of a job are considered pre-
cipitants of depression in that they limit one's control over the en-
vironment or lead one to believe that control does not exist. 
18 
Seligman has also addressed the issues of prevention and treat-
ment of learned helplessness. In the past, treatment was seen as ex-
posing the helpless subject to situations in which the outcome is con-
trollable (Seligman, Maier, Geer, 1968; Seligman, Rosellini, and Kozak, 
1975; Klein and Seligman, 1976). Prevention on the other hand Has seen 
as a history of reinforcement contingent upon one's actions (Seligman 
and Maier, 1967; Seligman and Groves, 1970; Seligman, 1975). So, the 
prevention and antidote of helplessness seemed to be the demonstrated 
helpfulness of one's actions. As a result of the reformulation, re-
searchers presently suggest a variety of prevention and treatment sug-
gestions. Therapists can aid depressed individuals by helping them to 
change the estimated probability of aversive outcome, to change the 
expectation from uncontrollability to controllability, or to change 
their attributions for success or failure. Abramson et al., (1978) 
has suggested specific ways these suggestions can be implemented (p. 69, 
Table 3). 
For Seligman, the goal is the development of personal "competency" 
cognitions. Individuals must believe they are generally able to control 
their environment. Klein and Seligman (1976) reported that success on 
a simple discrimination problem had a therapeutic effect on depressed 
subjects' performance and beliefs of control. Response contingent re-
inforcement is expected to help prevent depression (Seligman, 1974, 1975). 
In sum111ary, Seligman has developed a theory of depression support-
ed by extensive research. He has argued that while environmental fae:-
tors cause the emission of depressive behaviors, they are mediated and 
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probably secondary to the influence of cognitive factors. An interest-
ing question arises here, especially for those subjects with the attri-
butional style that typically attributes failure to global, stable, and 
internal factors. \fuy do depressives with this attributional style not 
concentrate on their positive control experiences? Perhaps their de-
pressive moods tend to cause them to associate to other depressive 
situations. It is also possible that their recall of positive contingent 
reinforcement situations is poor. 
~ogni!_iv~ Per~_p_ectives. One of the most well knmm exponents of 
the cognitive view is Beck (1967, 1970, 1974). Beck argues that depres-
sian is not conceptualized as an affective disorder; but rather, as a 
cognitive disorder. The primary symptom of depression is the cognitive 
r.r5<td ~vhich refers to an organized system of negative evaluations of 
oneself, one's future, and the environment. Lo\-J self-esteem,· thoughts 
of incompetency and inadequacy, poor body image, thoughts of impending 
distress, and perceptions of environmental hurdles \-Jere all examples of 
the depressive's cognitive set. Behavioral and affective symptoms are 
seen as consequences to the depressed cognitions. 
Resear~h conducted by Beck has been t-.;vofold. The development of 
a self--report. test of depression (Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Hock, 1nd I;rl·nugh 
1961) and a helplessness scale (Beck, Weissman, Lester, and Trexler, 
1974) were the first focus of attention. In addition, Beck has attempt-
eJ to support his contention that depressives have a negative view of 
the:nse1 ve~;, thci1:: future and their environment. Research has shm-m that 
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depressives dream significantly more about themes of deprivation, re-
jection, depreciation, self-injury, distorted body image, etc., than 
do nondepressives (Beck and Hurvick, 1959; Beck and Hard, 1961). Sim-
ilarly, depressives' earliest recollections have more themes of rejec-
tion than those of nondepressives (Beck and Hard, 1961). Depressed 
individuals are more likely to identify with a pictorial character ~;.;rho 
has had an unpleasant experience than a character who has avoided such 
an experience or had a pleasant experience (Beck, 1967). Beck (1972) 
also reports that depressives are ;=tpt to down-grade their positive at-
tributes when asked to compare them with their peers. Finally, depres-
sed subjects exhibited weaker self reference recall than normals sug-
gesting they may describe themselves inconsistently (Davis, 1979). All 
these studies support Beck's contention that depressives have a negative 
viev1 of themselves, their future, and their environment. Davis' study 
(1979) may additionally suggest differential recall bet\·Jeen depressives 
and normals. 
In summary, Beck has developed a theory of depression which clear-
ly emphasizes the role played by cognitive factors and deemphasizes the 
relative importance of environmental parameters. An important part of 
Deck's research seems to be the distinction between the nominal and the 
actual antecedent to depressive behavior. In essence, cognitions abo~!_ 
rather than physical stimuli often determine the course of one's be-
havior. 
Rehm and eovmrkers have developed another cognitive theory of 
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depression which is based on a modified version of Kaufer's self-control 
model (Kanfer, 1970a, 1970b, 1971; Kanfer and Karoly, 1972). Although 
this model has been used as a method for achieving behavioral change, in 
this context it will aid in explaining the occurrence of a variety of 
depressive symptoms. In particular, depressive behaviors are seen as 
arising from maladaptive self control patterns. Kaufer has argued 
that behavior is maintained and altered by subject mediated regulatory 
processes as well as the environment. Self regulation consists of 
three basic sequentially ordered operatioPs: self monitoring, self eval-
uation, and self reinforcement. Each of these will be described and 
its relationship to depression presented. 
The first component of Kaufer's model involves self monitoring. 
Both internal and external stimulus and response events can be monitored. 
Motoric respc.nses such as running, studying, hair pulling, etc., all 
fall into this category. Covert responses such as thoughts, imagery, 
and sensations like auditory hallucinations (Rutner and Bugle, 1969), 
obsessional thoughts (Mahoney, 1974), and critical self statements 
(Hannum, Thoreson, and Hubbard, 1974) can be monitored. 
In relating self monitoring processes to depression, a high fre-
quency of negative verbalizations and a low frequency of potentially 
enjoyable bEhaviors can be suggested. Rehm (1977) argues that depres-
sives have two such deficits. First, they attend to negative rather 
than positive events. Second, depressives are thought to give their 
attention to immediate effects of their behavior rather than to its 
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long term consequences. 
With regard to the first notion,Beck (1972) has proposed a sim-
ilar mechanism to account for cognitive distortions, namely that de-
pressed individuals are seen as selectively abstracting the unpleasant 
aspects of their experiences. A number of studies provide suggestive 
support for this concept. Pluchtick, Platman, and Fieve (1970) have 
examined the relationship between depression, ideal self-concept, and 
actual self-concept. Depression >vas found to correlate with negative 
actual self concept rather than an altered ideal self concept. One 
might speculate that this is a result of selective attention and memory 
from actual positive events toward actual negative events. Roth (1977) 
researched this hypothesis and although he did not find support for 
differential memory of positive and negative adjectives, he did find 
evidence of differential selective attention. Relative to nondepressives, 
depressed subjects monitored significantly more of their own negative 
and significantly fewer positive behaviors. Furthermore, it was post-
ulated that procedural parameters may have precluded the demonstration 
of recall differences. 
Cognitive distortions seen in depressives' self monitoring may 
o.:::cur because depressives "expect the worst." Friedman (196!~) reported 
that Hilile depressives and nondepressives performed equally well on a 
nun:he1.: of tasks, the depressive expected to do worse. Similarly, l\Iiller 
m1Ci Seligman (1973), Klein and Seligman (1976), and Guza (1979) found 
tlwt: depressed persons had lmver expectancies of success than nonde-
pr0ssed p2csons on laboratory tasks. Beck (1972) also suggested that 
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depressives are likely to entertain negative future oriented cognitions. 
Hith this research supporting such negative self monitoring it is easy 
to imagine why depressives may not look at the long term consequences 
of their behavior. Some studies suggest that when they do look at 
longer range consequences, depressives then ruminate about the delayed 
detrimental effects of their behavior (Schless, Schwartz, Goetz, and 
Mendels, 1974; Beck, 1972; Seligman, 1975). 
The second component of Kaufer's model is the self evaluatory pro-
cess. Monitored responses are evaluated against an internal criterion. 
Performance may fall above or below this standard. Rehm (1977) hypo-
thesizes two maladaptive patterns of self evaluation. First, depressed 
individuals often make inaccurate attributions of causality. Second, 
the depressive is likely to have stringent evaluative criteria. 
Hith regard to attribution, Rehm argues that depressives ascribe 
negative events to internal factors and positive events to external 
factors. For instance, a bad performance on a task would be due to per-
sonal inability while a good performance on the same task due to luck. 
Miller and Seligman (1973) arguing for the independence of responding 
and reinforcement, reported that depressives had lower expectancies re~ 
garding the likelihood of future successes after behaving successfully 
than did nondepressives. The same finding has been replicated in t1.•o 
other studies 0'1lller and Seligman, 1975; Klein and Seligman~ 1976). 
One might infer the subjects attributed their success to external factors. 
In addition to research support for external attributions, Guza (1979) 
reported the depressives \vere more likely to make attrUJ'J.tir:>ns in an 
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internal direction following feedback of failure at a task. 
Rehm (1977) also proposed that depressives employ a stringent 
self-evaluative criteria. Rehm states the evaluative criteria for de-
pressed people may be characterized by a high threshold for "exceLlence" 
and a low threshold for "failure." Similar notions have been offered 
by behavioral theorists (Marston, 1965; Bandura, 1971) and neo-analytic 
theorists (Melges and Bowlby, 1969). Common to all these perspectives 
is the theme that the depressed person has unreachable and unrealistjc 
goals and standards. Investigations (Galin and Terrell, Note 6; 
Murdock-Kitt, Note 7) have substantiated that depressed students tend to 
set higher goal levels that did nondepressed students. In addition, 
therapists have reported anecdotally that depressed patients may employ 
overly high criteria to evaluate their behavior (Bandura, 1971). All in 
all, studies support the hypothesis of depressed subjects having string-
ent self evaluations. 
Some of the self evaluation research suggests a differential recall 
component contributing to the stringent self evaluations of depressives. 
DeHonbreun and Craighead (1977) and Nelson and Craighead (1977) reported 
deprer;;sed subjects recalled less positive and more negative feedback 
th<:1n controls at high levels of reinforcement. Nelson et al (1977) also 
reported that depressed subjects accurately recalled negative reinforce--
ment '1-lhile normals underestimated the same. These studies suggest that 
emotional state may be related to the content of an individual's recall, 
specifically mood may be related to recall of mood--congruous material. 
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The final stage of the self control chain involves self reinforce-
ment. Contingent self reward and self punishment enables an individual 
to increase or decrease certain response patterns. The effect of self 
reinforcement on associated behaviors has been extensively reviewed by 
Thoreson and Mahoney (1974) and Mahoney and Thoreson (1974). Rehm (1977) 
postulates that depression is characterized by high rates of self punish-
ment and lov1 rates of self reward. 
Support for the contention that depression is associated with mal-
adaptive self reinforcement is obtained from three studies. When sub-
jects were told to reward themselves if they thought they were incorrect 
or not reinforce themselves when they were unsure of their responses, 
Rozensky, Rehm, Pry, and Roth (Note 8) found that depressed patients ad-
ministered more self punishments and fewer rewards than nondepressed 
patients or normal control patients. The groups did not differ with re-
gard to actual correct responses. Roth, Rehm, and Rozensky (Note 9), ww 
partially replicated this study, found that depressed college students 
emitted significantly more self punishments than nondepressed college 
students. Nelson and Craighead (1977) also report depressed subjects 
self reinforcing less than controls but did not find different rates of 
self punishment. In general, studies support that reinforcement is re-
lated to more stringent requirements in depressed individuals. 
Behavioral passivity is often cited as a core symptom of depres-
sion. Many Lehaviorists argue that retarded movements, infrequent par-
ticipation in previously reinforcing activities, etc. are related to a 
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lack of external reinforcement (Lazarus, 1968; Ferster, 1974; Lewinsohn, 
1974). Self control literature suggests that self administered and ex-
ternally administered reinforcements are equally able to maintain be-
havior patterns (Roth, 1977). 
Summary. Five theories of depression were described. All these 
theories of depression implicated cognition in some manner. Lewinsohn 
and Ferster suggest that the role of cognition in depression, if it exists 
at all, is merely a symptom resulting from environmental influences. 
Seligman proposes that cognition, plays a more important role in depres-
sion. A cognition of learned helplessness, as a result of response-
outcome. inconsistency, becomes a mind-set through which future behaviors 
are affected. 
Beck and Rehm are the strongest advocates of the cognitive deter-
adnant in depressive behavior. Both theorists suggest that cognitions 
are central to depression rather than merely sumptoms of depression. 
Beck's main premise states that cognitions about stimuli rather than the 
physical stimuli determine the course of an individual's behavior. Rehm 
has developed a theory in which depressives' self monitoring, self eval-
uation, a.nd self reinforcement differ from normals. Research suggests 
that self evaluatfon and possibly self monitoring may be affected by 
differential recall. 
B~'?:~_E_y__P:~~~arc_!l_~~~~nition and Emotion 
Recently, Gordon Bower, a cognitive psychologist, presented sev-
eral studies concerning the relationship between mood and cognitive 
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processes (1981). Bower's work adds supporting data and a somewhat dif-
ferent perspective to the previously discussed cognitive theories of 
depression. \fuereas cognitive theories view affect as resulting from 
cognitions, Bower introduced affect to aid in understanding memory and 
cognition. 
Theoretically, Bower approaches the relationship between depression 
and cognitive processes from a strong cognitive perspective. Still the 
importance of emotions playing a causal role in behavior is illustrated 
by his associative network theory of emotional behavior. "In this theory, 
emotion serves as a memory unit that can enter into associations with co-
incident events. Activation of this emotion unit aids in retrieval of 
events associated with it ... " (p. 129). An emotion can also prime themes 
for other cognitive processes such as free associations, interpretation 
of ambiguous material, perceptual organizations, etc. 
Three major areas of study have been opened under Bower. In all 
cases, research has primarily been done on subjects in >vhich happy or sad 
moods have been induced hypnotically. One area of study concerns mood-
state-dependent memory. In a representative study (Bower, 1981), sub-
jects learned two lists of words, one '"hile happy and one while sad. 
Tb~u they -.:ere asked to free recall the original list while either in 
the same or opposite mood. Controls who learned both lists and free re-
called all in the same mood were also included. Compared to the controls, 
state-dependency appeared in better recall in the same-mood list and 
1wrse rt~call in the opposite-mood list. Emotional mood \vas a helpful 
feature in distinguishing target material from interfering material. 
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State-dependent effects were also found in subjects remembering personal 
and childhood experiences. That is, people remembered a greater percent 
of experiences that were affectively congruent to the mood they were in 
during recall. 
A second area researched by Bower is that of emotion's powerful in-
fluences on cognitive processes such as free associations, fantasies, 
social perceptions and snap judgments about others. For example, Bower 
(1981) demonstrated that mood significantly influenced the interpretation 
of ambiguous scenes from TAT cards. This finding is consistent with the 
research of Roth and Rehm (1980) demonstrating that mood biased cate-
gories used in interpreting ambiguous interpersonal scenes. Clinically 
depressed subjects rated their interview behavior as having significantly 
.more negative and unskilled behaviors than nondepressed subjects. This 
also agrees with Rehm's (1977) hypothesis that depressives self monitor 
their own behaviors more negatively than nondepressives. Bower, Forgas, 
and Krantz (cited in Bower, 1981) partially replicated this experiment on 
college students hypnotized to feel either socially competent or incom-
petent. Students feeling socially incompetent rated their behaviors 
more negatively than students hypnotized to feel socially competent. 
People's moods also had powerful effects on free associations they 
gave to neutral words (Bower, 1981). Hypnotized subjects generated 
chained associates to five \-rords when they were happy and to another 
five words ,.,-.hen they were angry. When blind judges evaluated Hhether 
the chain shoHed "happiness" or "anger" or "can't decide," they judged 
anger accurately 83% of the time and happiness 73% of the time, signifi-
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cant at the .01 level. Fisher and Marrow (1934) used hypnosis-induced 
moods and Madigan and Ballenbach (Note 10) used moods induce:l ~y the 
Velton procedure with much the same results. 
The associative network theory also implies mood affects snap 
judgments of people or objects. Isen, Shalker, Clark and Karp (1978) 
found subjects gave more positive ratings on mock consumer surveys t.Jhen 
they were feeling good after receiving a gift. Bower (1981) found sub-
jects' thumbnail sketches of others were affected by their happy or an-
gry moods. It is suggested that current mood activates and primes mood-
congruent categories into readiness and these are used to assimilate and 
classify ambiguous experiences. 
The third area of study which Bower reviewed and resParched is that 
of salience of mood-congruous material. That is, people attend to and 
retGember information which is emotionally salient to their mood. Bower 
gave tr..;o examples of subjects shmving lower recognition thresholds for 
emotionally salient material. Clore (cited in Bower, 1981) found that 
happy and angry subjects responsed quicker and with less errors to mood-
salient material. Postman and Brown (1952) reported lmver recognition 
thresholds (less bright exposures needed) for successes-versus-failure 
words for subjects who had just experienced success or failure in an un-
related task. 
Research also shows evidence of mood-salient memory. In one ex-
periment (Bower et al., in press), subjects were made happy or sad by 
post-hypnotic suggestion and read a balanced third person account of two 
people, one tvho was happy-everything Ha3 going well, and onf~ Hho uas 
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sad-everything was going wrong. Subjects were found to identify with 
the mood-salient character and reported that this character was the 
central one in the story. The next day \vhile in a neutral mood sub-
jects recalled more facts about the character who exhibited the same 
mood they had felt the day before. Because they were in a neutral 
mood at the time of recall, this was a mood-congruous effect. In 
· another experiment (Bower, in press) subjects were induced to feel hap~ 
py or sad by post-hypnotic suggestions and read about one character who 
related an unrelated series of happy or sad incidents. Subjects report-
edly remember more incidents related \vith their mood. Happy readers 
recalled one and one half as many happy incidents as sad incidents and 
sad readers recalled one and one third as many sad as happy incidents. 
So, the mood contiguity effects seems to affect learning or wemory. 
In suw~ary, Bower has investigated the effects of mood and cog-
nitive process in terms of a network theory. Using primarily hypnotized 
subjects, Bmver reported three major findings. First, he reported a 
strong mood-state-dependent effect of memory. Secondly, he suggested 
that emotions affect cognitive processes such as free association by as-
similating and categorizing mood congruent categories into readiness. 
Lastly, Bo\ver reported evidence in which learning or memory for mood-
congruous material is higher than for mood~discordant material. 
Bower's findings have strong implications for the cognitive theo-
ries of depression. Bower's approach agrees with their basic premise 
that cognitions are central to depression. In addition, this research 
E.:xtends cognitive models of depression by investigating the relationship 
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between emotions and cognitive processes to further the understanding 
of hmv cognitions influence behavior. Specifically, Bmver suggests that 
emotions have powerful influences on memory, associations, fantasies, 
social perceptions, snap judgments, and salience of mood congruous ma-
terial. Differences in these cognitive processes, in turn, show up in 
differences in behavior. In sum, Bower's research as added supporting 
data and somewhat different perspective to the previously discussed 
cognitive theories of depression. 
T\vo questions arise from this research. The first is one that 
Bower has raised, that is, do demand characteristics play a role in the 
findings? Bm·1er (1981) reports a series of experiments (Bower and Vallone, 
cited in Bower, 1981; Stanislavski, 1936; and Teasdale and Fogarty, 
1979) which attempt to distinguish bet,veen automatic versus demand com-
pliance interpretations of the data. Specifically, are the emotions 
evoked by hypnotism real and if they are, were the subjects responding 
naturally to the stimuli or were they responding to please the experi-
menter? Although research attempting to control for demand character-
istics suggests that they do not play a role in the results, further 
research in which demand characteristics are not involved is suggested. 
A sc:concl question concerns the generalizability of Bmver's results. 
Although the expected results are obtained by using experimentally in-
duced moods, would naturally occurring moods found in the "re<:!l" world 
still have discernible effects on cognitive processes? To deter1nine 
whether Bower's findings have relevance for understanding and treating 
depression in clinical settings, research with subjects showing varying 
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degrees of naturally-occurring depression is necessary. 
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Several cognitive-behavioral theories of depression have develop-
ed in the last decade. Increasingly, these theories have incorporated 
both cognitive and environmental parameters to account for the complex 
symptomology of depression. In addition to these parameters, there is 
a move to include emotion and its relationship to depressive symptomolo-
gy. Gordon Bower (1981) has recently postulated the Associative Network 
Theory to explain the relationship between emotion and cognitions. In 
the group of studies associated \vith this theory, Bower has obtained 
results primarily through inducing moods with post-hypnotic suggestion. 
Two questions arise from this research. The first concerns demand com-
pliance biases. Although Bower has defended this criticism with relat-
ed research, additional studies which control for demand compliance 
should be carried out. A second question is related to the generaliz-
ability of Bower's results. Bower's research shows a remarkably strong 
relationship between emotions and mood in a lab setting with hypnotic 
induction of mood states. If one wishes to determine the relevance of 
Bower's results for the "real" world, research with less dramatic man-
ipulations or in naturalistic conditions is necessary. Partial repli-
cations using depressed and nondepressed subjects in normal or clinical 
settings might adequately demonstrate the relevance of Bower's findings 
for a clinical setting. 
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The present study was designed to expand upon Bower's research 
and its implications for understanding depression. This project ex-
amined various degrees of naturally-occurring depression in a normal 
population and its relationship to cognitive processes. Specifically, 
the relationship between levels of depression and word associations, 
the content of affect-laden recall, the amount of total recall, the 
amount and affect of interjections, and the ordering of recall were 
observed. 
HYPOTHESES 
1. Depression will be related to the affective content of what is re-
called. 
a. High depressed subjects will remember more sad words than happy 
words. 
b. Low depressed subjects will remember more happy words than sad 
words. 
2. Level of depression will be related to the total number of words re-
called. 
a. Depressed subjects will recall the least number of words. 
b. Normal (or medium depressed) subjects will remember more words 
than the high depressed subjects but less than low depressed 
subjects. 
c. Lo>..r depressed subjects >vill remember the most words. 
3. Level of depression will be related to the order of recall. 
a. High depressed subjects will remember sad words generally be-
fore the happy or neutral words. 
b. Lmv depressed subjects will remember the happy words generally 
before the neutral or sad words. 
4. Level of depression will be related to whether words are interjected 
into recall. 
a. Lo>..r and high depressed subjects Hill interject more Hords than 
medium depressed (or normal) subjects. 
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5. Level of depression will be related to the nature of the words in-
terjected. 
a. High depressed subjects will interject more sad ~vords. 
b. Low depressed subjects will interject more happy words. 
6. Level of depression will be related to the nature of the chain asso-
ciations to neutral words. 
a. High depressed subjects will chain associate more depressively 
to neutral words while low depressed subjects will chain asso-
ciate more positively to neutral words. 
METHOD 
Su_Ej_ects 
The subjects in this study were undergraduate students who volun-
teered to participate in this experiment as an extra credit option for 
their introductory psychology course. They were divided into three 
groups of high, medium, and low depression based on their score on the 
Multiscore Depression Inventory (Berndt, Petzel, & Berndt, 1980), an 
inventory designed to measure depression in a normal population. Be-
cause it was difficult to get depressed subjects to volunteer for extra 
credit, some subjects were called and asked if they wished to receive 
extra credit for participating in a research project. Information on 
their depression level was available from a group of survey tests given 
at the beginning of the semester. To be in the high depression group, 
subjects scored 50 or higher (one standard deviation above the mean) on 
the MDI; the medium or normal depression group was based on subjects 
who scored between 10 and 50 on the ~IDI; and the subjects who scored 10 
or below (one standard deviation below the mean) constituted the low 
depression group. In addition, to provide further validation of the 
level of depression, the subjects were measured on the Beck Depression 
Inventory. The Beck scores for the three groups were as follm-1s: Low 
Depression Group, H = 1.7, s.d. = 2.1; Medium Depression Group, H 
4.4, s.d. = 4.1; High Depression Group, M = 12.5, s.d. = 8.5; 83 
subjects were used in all (Low- 20, Medium- 42, High- 21). 
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Haterials 
Beck Depression Inventory. Subjects were given the Beck Depression 
Inventory (BDI: Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Hock, & Erbaugh, 1961) and the 
Multiscore Depression Inventory (MDI: Berndt, Petzel, & Berndt, 1980). 
The BDI is comprised of 21 items, each of 'l:vhich represents a discrete 
depressive symptom. Each item includes graded statements pertaining to 
the severity of the symptom. The examiners endorse the statement best 
matching their behavioral or experimental state. An evaluation of the 
internal consistency of the BDI (Beck, 1967) resulted in a reliability 
of .86 using the Pearson r; with a Spearman Brown correction of this 
rose to .93. The traditional test-retest method of assessing stability 
and consistency were not considered appropriate because the memory fac-
tory might inflate the score hm..rever, an indirect method of est:Lmating 
the stability of the instrument found that changes in the score of the 
inventory paralleled changes in clinical ratings (made by psychiatrists) 
indicating a "consistent relationship of the instruments to the patient's 
clinical state" (Beck, 1967, p. 195). A concurrent validity of .75 was 
found in a correlation between the BDI and the HHPI-D scale. Also a 
validity score of .66 was obtained between the BDI and the Depression 
Adjective Check List. Further measures of internal consistency, con-
current validity, and construct validity are available in Beck (1967). 
M~ ti_§~or~~- DEJJression Invento~. The Multiscore Depression Inven-
tory (MDI: Berndt, Petzel, and Berndt, 1980) is a multidimensional trait 
s•::ale designed for normal populations which contains 118 items to be 
marked true or false. Besides providing a global (full scale) measure 
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of depression, the MDI provides measures on ten subscales: guilt, in-
strumental helplessness, learned helplessness, pessimism, energy level 
(fatigue), low self esteem, sad mood, irritability, cognitive difficulty, 
and social introversion. The length of most of the subscales is 12 items 
except for guilt \vhich has 10 i terns. The mean score of the full scale 
test is 30 with a SD of 3. The MDI full scale score has a Kuder 
Richardson reliability of r = .96 on initial and cross validation 
samples. More information of the reliabilities of the subscales is 
available on Table 1. Evidence of concurrent validity of the full scale 
MDI was obtained by correlations with the BDI and the DACL (~ • 69, 
E < .001 and r = .77, z < .001, respectively). Face validity of the sub-
scales was established by role playing students who scored higher on. the 
scales after reading a character sketch (for all subscales ~ < .001). 
Results from ten clients in therapy provided criterion-related validity 
for the full scale MDI and all its subscales (for the Fatigue subscale 
E < .01, for the Social Introversion subscale z < .05, and for the full 
scale HOI and all the other subscales .E < .001). Further information of 
reliability is available in Berndt, Petzel, and Berndt (1980). 
Stimulus Words. For the recall portion of this project, a list of 
21 words (7 happy, 7 neutral, and 7 sad) were used. The happy and sad 
\vords v7ere picked from those found on the Depressive Adjective Check List 
(DACL: Lubin, 1967) which distinguished between depressed and nondepres-
sed people. The reliabilities of the DACL words range from .82 to .93 
for normals. This indicates that subjects basically respond the same way 
to a word over time. Correlations between the DACL and the BDI as well 
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TABLE 1 
Internal Consistency Reliabilities for Original and Crossvalidated 
Samples on the Total and Subtotal Scores on the MDI 
Sample 
Cross 
Scale Original Validated 
(n=200) (n=263) 
Sad Mood .87 .86 
Fatigue .91 .91 
Learned Helplessness .83 .71 
Social Introversion .86 .84 
Irritability .84 .85 
Instrumental Helplessness .85 .87 
Pessimism .84 .85 
Low Self Esteem .86 .82 
Cognitive Difficulty .82 .82 
Guilt .79 .78 
Full Scale MDI .96 .96 
------
Note. From "Development and Initial Evaluation of a Multiscore 
Depression Inventory" by D.J. Berndt, T.P. Petzel, and S.N. Berndt, 
Journa~. ot _£erson_::1.lit_y Assessment, 1980, 44(4), p. 396-403. 
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as the Zung Depression Scale are significant at or beyond the .05 level 
suggesting that identifications with these words are valid indicators 
of depression (Lubin, 1967). The neutral words were picked on the 
basis of their neutral face validity. The three categories of words 
were matched on frequency of use (Kucera and Francis, 1967). Each word 
was printed on a 3 x 8 card in black magic marker and placed in random 
order. The resulting list of words given each subject 'vas: Miserable, 
Interested, Plant, Lost, Guarantee, Introduce, Somber, Lucky, Active, 
Failure, Cheerful, Happen, Metal, Joint, ~onderful, Burdened, Discouraged, 
Enthusiastic, Invest, Heary, and Animate. Table 2 explains which words 
were in each category. In addition, the experimenter had a half sheet 
of paper Hith the list of words on it to record the number and order .of 
the words recalled. 
For the association part of the experiment, 5 neutral words were 
picked on the basis of their face validity. The words were: Life, Ex-
perience, Idea, Music, and Function. The >vords were each placed on 
sep::1rate 4 x 9 sheets of paper. Each sheet Hith a word had five lines 
belo>v the >·lOrd where associations were written. The five sheets for 
each subject were stapled together with a cover sheet for directions on 
the front. 
Procedure 
Each subject was seen individually for 45 minutes. The subjects 
began this experiment by taking the Multiscore Depression Inventory 
and the Beck Depression Inventory, respectively. They had been told 
that the experiment '"as studying "the effect of certain personality 
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TABLE 2 
Recall Words Divided According to Affect 
Happy Words Neutral Words Sad \\fords 
Interested Plant Miserable 
Lucky Guarantee Lost 
Active Introduce Somber 
Cheerful Happen Failure 
Honderful Metal Burdened 
Enthusiastic Joint Discouraged 
Animate Invent Heary 
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characteristics on cognitive processes." Secondly, they were given the 
word association packet \vhich had the following directions taped on the 
cover page: "On each of the follm..ring pages, look at the typed stimulus 
word and write the first 5 words the stimulus brings to mind." After 
the subjects were finished with the vwrd associations, they were told: 
Next, I am going to shmo1 you 21 words, one at a time. When I 
finish, I would like to see how many you can remember. Just 
recall as many as you can and I'll mark them down on this paper. 
No one can remember them all, just recall as many as you can. 
Any questions? Ready? 
Each word was shown and verbalized to the subject one at a time for 2 
second intervals. The entire list was read and shm..rn to the subjects 
and they were asked to verbally recall as many as possible. After the 
subjects had recalled as many as they could initially, the experimenter 
asked if they wished to have more tine. Any additional words remembered 
were also recorded. When the task was completed, the subjects \vere al-
lowed to look at the experimenter's list on which their responses were 
recorded. It was explained that the experimenter was interested in 
which \vords as well as how many were recalled and how that might be re-
lated to subjects' scores on the inventories. 
RESULTS 
This study was designed to examine the relationship between de-
pression and two cognitive processes, immediate recall and association. 
Specifically, the six hypotheses were examined. They involved the re-
lationship between: depre·ssion and affective content of recall; depres-
sion and amount of total recall; depression and the order of recall;· 
depression and the number and affective content of interjected words; 
and depression and associations to neutral words. The results are or-
ganized and presented as they apply to each hypothesis. 
Depression and Affective Recall 
Table 3 presents a mean number of happy, sad, and neutral words 
rer.1embered in different levels of depression for all 83 subjects. An 
extremely orderly visual trend is seen in the direction of the hypothe-
sis. That is, subjects scoring as low depressed (happy subjects) recall-
ed an average of 3.277 happy words and only 2.666 sad words. On the 
other hand, high depressed subjects remembered on the average only 2.952 
happy words and 3.330 sad words. At all levels of depression, neutral 
words were remembered at lower rates than happy or sad words (lo\v de-
pression 2.444, medium depression = 2.545, high depression 2.850). 
Not only does there appear to be an orderly progression within each level 
uf depression, there also appears to be expected results between each 
level of depression. That is, happy Hords seemed to be remembered on 
the average more often by happy subjects than medium or high depressed 
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TABLE 3 
The Mean Number of Happy, Neutral, and Sad Words Recalled 
at Different Levels of Depression for 83 Subjects 
Happy Neutral Sad Total 
Words Recalled Words Recalled Words Recalled \vords Recalled 
Lo\v 
Depression 3.277 2.444 2.666 8.389 
Hedium 
Depression 3.182 2.545 3.1591 8.909 
High 
Depression 2.952 2.850 3.300 8.952 
Average Words l.807 Recalled 3.145 2,590 3.072 
-------
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subjects (3.277, 3.182, 2.95; respectively) and sad words appeared to be 
remembered on the average more often by highly depressed subjects than 
medium or happy subjects (3.330, 3.159, 2.66~ respectively). A further 
investigation into the orderliness of these mean scores was accomplished 
by breaking the large group of medium depressed subjects into two groups 
called low-medium depression and high-medium depression. The resulting 
mean number of happy, neutral, and sad words showed smaller yet still 
orderly results in the direction of the hypothesis. This summary can 
be seen in Table 4. 
Several sets of analyses (a multivariate analysis, a univariate 
analysis, and a regression analysis) were used to examine the relation-
ship between depression and affective content of recall suggested by 
Tables 3 and 4. The results of these analyses are in the following para-
graphs. 
A mu]tivariate analysis using level of depression (high, medium, 
and low) as the predictor variable and number of happy, sad, and neutral 
\oJOrds recalled vms performed. There was no overall effect when a general 
linear models procedure from the Statistical Analysis System (SAS, 1979) 
was used. This procedure produced four different multivariate E scores, 
none of ~.,rhich were significant: 
HotelJing-LaHley Trace, .£.(6,154) = .71, NS; 
Pillai's Trace, K(6,158) = .71, NS: 
Wilk's Criterion, K(6,156) = .Jl, NS; and 
Roy's Haximum Root Criterion, £(2,80) = 2.03, NS. 
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TABLE 4 
The Mean Number of Happy, Neutral, and Sad Words Recalled \~en 
Splitting the Medium Depression Group into Low-Medium 
Depression and High-Hedium Depression 
Low-Hedium 
Depression 
(HDI: H-26) 
High--Hedium 
Depression 
Happy Words 
Recalled 
3.24 
3.00 
Neutral Words 
Recalled 
3.08 
2.58 
Sad Words 
Recalled 
2.44 
3.21 
(MDI: 28-44) ----------...!.------=-----____:_ 
Total Words 
Recalled 
8.2 
8.5 
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The failure to find significance with the multivariate analysis 
would lead one to believe the univariate analysis of variance \•/Ould not 
he significant. This was indeed the case. The analysis of variance 
showed there was no relationship between the three levels of depression 
and the number of neutral words recalled, .!:(2,80) = .45, NA. A test 
of linear contrast showed no trend between depression and the number of 
neutral words recalled, .!:(1,80) = .79, NS. There was also no signifi-
cant relationship bet\veen depression and the number of happy words re-
called, _I(2,80) = .29, NS. A check for the linear relationship between 
depression and happy words recalled was also not significant, .!:(1,80) == 
.57, NS. Thirdly, there was no relationship between level of depression 
and the number of sad words recalled, .!:(2,80) = 1.41, .2. = .2495,however, 
this latter relationship was considerably less likely to ~2ppen by chance 
than in the first two analyses. The linear contrast again showed no trend, 
!(1,80) = 2.55, NS. In sum, there was no statistically significant dif-
ference betweeh levels of depression and the affective content of the 
words remembered. Each level of depression recalled approximately the 
same number of happy words, each level of depression recalled approxin1ately 
the same number of neutral words, and each level of depression recalled 
approximately the same number of sad words. 
In an effort to obtain results by using the entire range of depres-
sion scores as predictors, a group of regression analyses were also per-
formed on the data. A simple regression of the MDI full scale score's 
ability to pred:Lct the number of happy \Wrds remembered approached sig-
nificanc:P, 1:~(1, 81) == 3. 03, _£_ = • 085. A regression of the NTH full scale 
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score with the number of neutral words recalled, £(1,81) = .21, N~ and 
with the number of sad words recalled, £(1,81) 1.99, NS, yielded no 
significant results. 
Since the HDI had ten subscales of depression, it seemed reasonable 
to also examine their contributions in more detail. Table 5 shows the 
summary of a regression analysis testing for the variance uniquely ac-
counted for by each of the ten MDI subscales in recalling happy words. 
The regression analysis showed that the ten MDI subscales accounted for 
a statistically significant 27.70% of the variance in the number of hap-
py words recalled, £(10,72) = 2.76, .E.< .01. Only one MDI subscale (Low 
Self Esteem) was able to uniquely account for a significant pattern of 
variance in the number of happy words recalled, £(1, 72) == 7. 41, _E_ < • Cll. 
However, the subscales for Sad Mood, Learned Helplessness, and Guilt ap-
proached significance, (for Sad Mood, !_ (1, 72) = 3. 22, .E. = • 0 77; for 
Learned Helplessness, £(1,72) = 2.95, _E_ = .09; and for Guilt, £(1,72) 
3.20, _E_ = .07}. Overall, the ten MDI subscales could not predict a sig-
nificant portion of the variance of the sad words recalled, !_(10,72) = 
1.41, NS. Also, there were no statistically significant relationships 
between the ten subscales and the nu:ober of neutral words recalled, 
£(10,72) = .46, NS. 
Overall, the hypothesis that depression would be related to af-
fective content of what is recalled received minimal support. Of the 
several analyses performed, significant results Here only obtained in a 
regression unalysis relating the contributions of the ten MDI subscales 
tn the number of happy words recalled. One subscale, Low Self Esteem, 
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TABLE 5 
A Regression Analysis Testing for the Variance Uniquely Accounted for 
by Individual Subscales in Recalling Happy Words 
Unique Variance 
Subscale DF Accounted for f Value Pr > F 
Instrumen~al Helplessness 1 2.8375 1. 96 .1661 
Low Self Esteem 1 10.7482 7.41 .0081* 
Sad Mood 1 4.6704 3.22 .0769 
Learned Helplessness 1 4. 2772 2.95 .0902 
Energy Level (fatigue) 1 3.0821 2.13 .1492 
Irritability 1 0.5817 0.40 .5285 
Pessimism 1 2.6700 1.84 .1790 
Cognitive Difficulty 1 2.0720 1.43 .2358 
Guilt 1 4.791 3.30 .0733 
Social Introversion 1 1.1140 o. 77 .3837 
10 MDI Sub scales 10 27.70 2.76 .0061* 
Note. *.E. <.OS. 
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uniquely accounted for a significant portion of variance while three 
other subscales approached significance. 
Depression and Total Recall 
Table 6 also suggested a trend between level of depression and the 
total number of words recalled. The table showed low depressives re-
membering an average of 8.389 words, medium depressives remembering about 
8.909 words, and high depressives remembering an average of 8.952. Such 
a trend, if significant would be in the opposite direction of the hy-
pothesis. To test this data, another analysis of variance using three 
level of depression as predictors was performed. The analysis of variance 
showed no relationship between the HDI full scale score and the total 
number of words remembered, E(2,80) = .804, NS. Further, a multiple re-
gression analysis indicated that the ten }IDI subscales were able to ac-
count for 21.656% of the variance however, this was not significant, 
!(10,72) = 1.99, NS. In a step-wise multiple regression, the Low Self 
Esteem scale and the Guilt subscale best predicted the total number of 
words remembered. Together they accounted for 16.7% of the variance. 
The Guilt subscale uniquely accounted for 7% of the variance, E(l0,72) 
= 6.585, E < .01 and the Low Self Esteem subscale accounted for 4.5% 
of the variance, £(10,72) = 4.173, E < .01. 
In sum, even though a visual trend suggested differences, the hy-
pothesis relating level of depression to total amount of recall was not 
statistically supported. T\.;ro subsea] es uniquely accounted for signifi-
cant amounts of variances suggesting there may be a small relationship 
between some particular traits found in depression and amount of total 
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TABLE 6 
A Step-wise Multiple Regression Analysis Testing for the Variance 
Accounted for by Indivjdual Subscales in Total \.Jords Remembered 
% of Unique Variance % of Variance Beta 
Subscale Accounted for Accounted for Weights F 
Guilt 7.165 6.108 .3914 6.585* 
Low Self Esteem 4.541 10.588 . 3470 4.173* 
Energy level (fatigue) 2.277 .915 .2302 2.093 
Social Introversion .901 1.040 .1133 .828 
Irritability .859 1.235 .1101 .789 
Cognitive Difficulty .511 .1003 .457 
Pessimism .707 .305 .1550 .650 
Instrumental Helplessness .417 .574 .0986 .384 
Sad Hood .316 .0998 .307 
Learned Helplessness .02 .020 .0223 .018 
10 J:.IDI Subscales 21.657 1.99 
Note. *2_ < , 01. 
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recall. 
Depression and Order of Recall 
To analyze the order of the words remembered, the recalled t,.;rords 
were divided into three groups, the first third of the words recalled, 
the second third of the \vords recalled, and the last third of the words 
recalled by each subject. Happy words were rated 1, neutral words \vere 
rated 2, and sad words were rated 3. The average level of affect in 
each of the three word groups was computed and regression analyses relat-
ing the total MDI scores to affect level in each word group were per-
formed. There was no relationship between the level of depression 
(total MDI score) and the affect of the first group of words remembered, 
£(1,80) = 1.11, NS. Also there was no significant relationship bet•veen , 
the level of depression and the affect of the second group of words re-
membered, £(1,80) == 3.72, NS,or the affect of the third group of words 
remembered, £(1,80) = .494, NS. 
A regression analysis relating the ten subscales' scores to affect 
of the first group of words recalled, L(l0,71) = .71, NS, and second 
group of words recalled, F(l0,72) = .94, NS, were both not significant. 
However, a regression analysis relating the subscale scores to affect 
of the third group of words recalled was significant, £(10,72) = 2.0~, 
J?_ < • 05. On closer analysis, the Sad Hood sub scale, £(1, 72) = 6. 89, 
_£ < .01, a.ud the Learned Helplessness subscale, £(1. 72) = 4.09, E < .05, 
uniquely accounted for a significant portion of the variance. Table 7 
shO\vS a sum.rnary of each of the ten subscales 1 relationship to the affect 
of the third group of words recalled. 
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TABLE 7 
A Regression Analysis Relating Individual MDI Subscales to the Affect 
of the Third Group of \·Jords Recalled 
Sub scale DF Type IV SS F Pr > F 
Instrumental Helplessness 1 .7835 3.10 .0826 
Low Self Esteem 1 .6227 2.46 .1210 
Sad Mood 1 .7!;31 6 .89M~ .0106 
Learned Helplessness 1 1. 0351 4.09* .0468 
Energy Level (fatigue) 1 .5946 2.35 .1295 
Irritability 1 .5973 2.36 .1287 
Pessimism 1 ,!:.763 1.88 .1742 
Cognitive Difficulty 1 .!.,92!.; 1. 95 .1671 
Guilt 1 .5753 2.28 .1358 
Social Introversion 1 .0024 .01 .9227 
10 MDI Sub scales 10 5.1894 2.05 .0399 
Note. *.E. < .05 
**_E_ < .01 
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In sun~ary, a regression analysis relating the total MDI score to 
order of the v1ords recalled showed no significant results. When in-
specting the subscales' relationship to order of words recalled, it was 
discovered that there was a significant relationship between the sub-
scale score and the last third of the words recalled. Specifically, the 
Sad Hood and Learned Helplessness subscales were primarily responsible 
for this significance; scores on these subtests were positively related 
to recalling words of similar affect. 
_Depression and Interjected Words 
A one-way analysis of variance predicting the number of words added 
from three levels of depression showed no relationship between level of 
depression and total number of interjected words, !_(2,80) = .327, NS. 
This hypothesis was also tested using a regression analysis. An analysis 
predicting the number of words from the ~fDI full scale score also yielded 
no results, !_(1,81) .OS, NS. 
To predict the affect of added ~ords from three levels of depres-
sion, the added words were scaled according to their affect level in the 
manner previously described and a MA.'\OVA was performed. There was no 
overall effect. Four F scores were computed and none reached statistical 
significance: 
Hotelling-Lawley, Trace, !_(6,154) = 1.13, NS; 
Pillai's Trace, !_(6,158) 1.14, NS; 
Wilk's Criterion, !_(6,156) = 1.14, NS; and 
Roy's Maximum Root Criterion, £0,80) = 2.72, NS. 
'J'his would lead one to believe that there were no mdvariate effects, 
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which was indeed the case. The one-way analysis of variance shoHs no 
significant relationship between a person's level of depression and the 
affect of the first word they may have added, K(2,80) = .90, NS; be-
tween the level of depression and the second word they may have added, 
K(2,80) = .28, NS; or between the level of depression and the third 
word they ~ay have added, K(2,80} = .80, NS. 
Overall, there was no support for either the hypothesis that de-
pression was related to the number of words a subject may have inter-
jected into recall or the hypothesis that level of depression was re-
lated to the affect of words a subject may have interjected. 
pepression and Associations 
To test the hypothesis that emotion influences chain associations 
to neutral stimuli, a procedure similar to Bower's was used. Two judges 
independently rated the subjects' chain associations as either made by 
a happy, neutral, or sad person. The criterion used to determine whether 
the associations were influenced by emotion was the judges' ability to 
correctly differentiate the depression level of the individual who made 
the associations. Table 8 is a su~uary of the average of the judges' 
ratings of the associations. The judges were able to accurately identify 
depressed subjects an average of 33.3% of the time, neutral subjects 
56.8% of the time, and happy subjects 36% of the time. A Chi Square 
performed on the nine possible ratings of the judges was not significant, 
Chi Square (4) = 5.54, NS. The judges were not rating the associations 
at a significantly different from chance level. When neutral responses 
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TABLE 8 
Average Results Obtained When Judges Judged Chain Word Associations 
Depressed 
Neutral 
Happy 
Column 
Totals 
into One of Three Levels of Depression 
Associ2tions Judged As 
Depressed Neutral Happy 
7 12 2 
7.5 25 11.5 
2.5 9 6.5 
17 46 20 
1--------1----------L----
Raw 
Totals 
21 
44 
18 
I 83 
_L ___ _ 
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were discarded (as in Bower's research), associations of depressed sub-
jects were accurately distinguished from happy subjects' associations 
77.8% of the time. Happy subjects' associations were accurately dis-
tinguished from depressed associations 72% of the time. Theoretically 
expected frequencies were too small to appropriately compute a two by 
two analysis using only the four corners of the table. So, although the 
percentages appear to be large, a Chi Square was not computed. In sum, 
the hypothesis relating depression to associations of neutral stimuli 
received minimal support. 
DISCUSSIO~ 
This research was based on the general premise that mood is re-
lated to cognitive processes such as recall and associations. In gener-
al, only minimal support was shown for some of the hypotheses associated 
with this premise. Specifically, a relationship between depression and 
affective recall was apparent only in a regression analyses relating the 
ten subscale scores to the number of happy words recalled. Also, a 
small relationship between the total number of words recalled and some 
particular traits in depression was shown by the Low Self Esteem and 
Guilt subscales accounting for a significant unique variances. Again, 
only minimal support was given to the hypothesis between depression and 
the order of the words recalled when a regression analysis related two 
sub scales to the last third of the '"ords each subject recalled. Lastly, 
the relationship between depressio~ and associations to neutral words 
was only given minimal support, i.e., although preliminary analyses 
were not significant, an analysis of the extreme scores (too small to 
compute a Chi square) visually sup?orted the hypothesis. 
These results seem rather inconsistent with Bm.,er' s '"ork and the 
research of other cognitive theorists \vho have shown differences in 
memory and cognitive process between depressed and nondepressed subjects. 
The inconsistency in the results concerning depression and associations 
are particularly disturbing since results have been obtained when using 
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hypnotic manipulation or a Velton procedure. Some explanations might 
be offered to explain this study's failure to find a strong relation-
ship between emotion and memory or associations. 
First, one might hypothesize that these depression groups were not 
distinct. Even though the high depressed and low depressed subjects 
were respectively scoring one standard deviation above and below the 
mean on the MDI, that may not be a large enough_difference. Indeed, 
the subjects were taken from an academic setting and although their de-
pression level was varied for this setting, the depressed subjects were 
not considered clinically depressed. To test the hypothesis that the 
criteria for levels of depression in this experiment were not extreme 
enough to show a difference, an analysis of variance was done using only 
the ten least depressed subjects for the low depression group and only 
the ten most depressed subjects for the high depression group. This 
analysis of variance, using only the extreme scores, sho\ved a signifi-
cant relationship between level of depression and affect of words re-
membered, X(2,36) = 3.27, .E_ < .05. Table 9 summarizes the mean words 
recalled by the different levels of extreme depression. It shows an 
even clearer trend in the direction of the hypothesis than was evident 
in Tables 3 and 4. This analysis supports the speculation that the de-
pression groups were not distinct and offers considerable encouragement 
for future research in this area. Future studies examining affectiv~ 
content of recall should use subjects exhibiting a brander range of 
depression. 
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TABLE 9 
Mean Words Recalled When Using Only the Ten Most Extreme Scores 
Obtained on the Depression Level Continuum 
Happy Words Neutral Words Sad Words Total Words 
Recalled Recalled Recalled Recalled 
Subjects 13.4 
-· 
Ten Least 
Depressed 2.6 2.5 8.2 
Ten Most 
Depressed Subjects 2.4 2.3 3.5 8.5 
62 
Similar analyses using the ten most extreme subjects on each end 
of the depression scale were performed on the other hypotheses Hith 
less encouraging results. An analysis of variance relating depression 
and total amount of recall still yielded no significant results, £(1,18) 
= 4.41, NS. A visual examination of depression and amount of words in-
terjected showed the number of interjections for those scoring extreme-
ly high or extremely low on the depression scale was almost identical, 
reinforcing the previous conclusion that level of depression is unrelat-
ed to the number of words interjected. Hhen examining the tHenty most 
extreme cases for differences in the affect of the words they may have 
interjected, the ten highest depressives interjected four happy words 
c_~nd two sad words while the ten lm.;rest depressives interjected six happy 
words and one E~ad word. None of the t\.;renty extreme subjects interjected 
a neutral word. A Chi Square can not be computed on this data because 
of the small frequencies. One might speculate, however, that future 
examination of this phenomenon with a large group might yield signifi-
cant results. All in all, post hoc analyses on the hypotheses (other 
than the relationship between depression and affective recall) yielded 
no significant results. 
A second possibJ.e explanation for the failure of this study to 
find a relationship between depression and memory or associations might 
be the choice of words. The happy and sad words were chosen from the 
DACL which generally differentiates betHeen depressives and nondepres-
sives. In this study however, there Has no guarantee that a word 
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stimulated the affect in a particular subject hypothesized by the ex-
perimenter. For instance, the word "wonderful" which was categorized 
as happy in the experiment may, because of an individual experience, 
have been seen as a neutral or depressing word by a particular subject. 
Another subject may see "guarantee" as a happy word \vhen it was cate-
gorized as a neutral word in the experiment. Furthermore, in the pre-
sent research, the experimenter was unable to determine how much affect 
was related to a particular stimulus word. For instance, do "animate" 
and "lucky" present generally equal amounts of positive feelings as 
stimulus words? If so, then do they present equal amounts of positive 
feelings to different individuals? One might also ask if the affect 
of the positive words was as extreme as the affect of the negativ~ words 
and how neutral were the neutral words? In this research, it was diffi-
cult to determine if the affect of the stimulus word was the same for 
all subjects and if the same amount of affect was generated by each word 
to each subject. This explanation would account for an analysis of 
variance relating depression to amount of sad words remembered to be 
approaching significance while ANOVAs relating depression to the recall 
of happy, or neutral words did not i.e., perhaps the sad words were more 
uniformly extreme affective stimuli for more subjects. To control for 
thir.; in the future, each subject should rate each stimulus word on a 
depression continuum. 
A third explanation for finding minimal or no significant relation-
ship between depression and amount of total recall, ordering of recall, 
number of interjections, or affect of interjections may be that there 
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actually is not relationship between depression and these aspects of 
memory. Other variables may be operating here. One such phenomenon 
was observed during the experiment. After subjects initially recalled 
the words they could remember, the experimenter routinely asked if they 
wished to have more time. On almost all occasions subjects recalled a 
few more \-lOrds which were also recorded. After some time the experiment-
er observed that subjects varied widely on the number of \<lords they 
would initially recall before giving up. They also seemed to vary con-
siderably on the number of words they were able to recall after the ex-
perimenter's con@ent. Some subjects persevered longer and remembered 
more words before saying they were done and some gave up rather easily. 
The interesting fact here is that all subjects averaged approximately 
the same total recall, so those that gave up easily remembered less af-
ter the experimenter's prompt. 
An interesting phenomenon to study during future research on 
memory is at what point in the recall the subject requires prompting. 
Here,depressed subjects seemed to give up more easily and require 
prompting earlier in the recall period, i.e., the subjects exhibited 
a performance deficit r~ther than a memory deficit. This hypothesis 
would agree with Ferster's hypothesis that depressed individuals ex-
hibit decreased behavior (1973), Seligman and associates' hypothesis of 
lower compet.iveness and behavioral passivity in depressives (Powell 
and Creer, 1969; Maier, Anderson, and Liberman, 1972), and the ideas 
that depressives have less confidence in themselves (Beck, 1967) and 
"expect the worst" (Friedman, 1964). Hhere there might be no actual 
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memory differences, future research using the MDI might yield a relation-
ship between depression and performance differences. In fact, this 
might account for the choice of the two subscales which did uniquely 
account for a significant portion of the variance, the Low Self Esteem 
and Guilt subscales. People who score high on the Low Self Esteera scale 
report feelings of inadequacy and incompetence while those scoring high 
on the Guilt subscale typically evaluate personal actions as negative. 
Even though the subjects were prompted, these may still be picking up 
performance differences rather than any ar:tual memory differences. In 
sura, the third possibility this study obtained little or no significant 
results between depression and several aspects of memory may be because 
there genuinely is no relationship. Supposed relationships may be sug-
gested by performance deficits in depressed subjects rather than any_ 
actual memory differences. 
With the limitations of the study in mind then, this research still 
contributes to Bower's preliminary Kork in relating depression to cog-
nitive processes. First, this study did report significant differences 
between high and low depressed subjects in their immediate affective re-
call. It is certainly encouraging that a significant relationship be-
t\V'een mood and memory was found in a study in which the design had 
significant limitations. TI1is leads one to believe that the relevance 
of the mood-congruous effect on memory on naturally-occurring emotions 
is significant and an area worthy of future research. In addition to 
studying depressive affect, one might presume to find significant re-
sults using anger, sad and frightened affects as well. Secondly, 
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although there may be no differences in the total encouraged amount of 
immediate recall between high and lmv depressed subjects, there is prob-
ably a strong expectation difference which affects the subjects' initial 
effort at response. This expectation and resulting performance bias 
might well be predictable by a knowledge of the subject's depression. 
Furthermore, it seems significant to explore whether these performance 
differences are indeed a result of differential expectations which can 
be minimized by a mere statement of openness by the researcher rather 
than something more deep seated or an actual difference in capability. 
Such information seems valuable for those in clinical work. A third 
area of impact on Bower's preliminary research is the yet unclear rela-
tionship between depressive affect and ordering of significant recall 
responses found in this study. More research is needec ~o clarify pos-
sible organizational or conceptual differences in the cognitive process-
es of depressed subjects. 
This study also contributes to Bower's preliminary \wrk by showing 
memory differences related to extreme levels of naturally-occurring 
mood found in a normal college population. Some of the earlier reserva-
tions of previous researchers concerning the need to strongly manipulate 
the subjects' mood to obtain results, the "realness" of the mood induced, 
possible demand characteristics resulting from evident n~od inducements, 
and generalizability of previous lab findings are minimized by this de-
sign. 
More theoretically, the results of this study provide some support 
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for Bower's notion of the associative network theory of behavior, i.e., 
that emotion serves as a memory unit. The activation of emotion serves 
as a retrieval aid which affects cognitions and the resulting behavior. 
Specifically, Bower's theory of mood-congruous memory was supported 
when this study found a significant difference in the affective content 
between high and low depressed subjects. Future research should in-
vestigate performance measures involved in selective memory. 
On yet a broader spectrum, this study contributes to the contin-
ually evolving literature on depression and predicting depressive be-
havior. Studies such as this highlight the complexity of the relation-
ship between cognition and emotion and the need for a better understand-
ing of the role that processes such as selective attention and memory 
may play in this relationship. 
SUMMARY 
This study investigated the relationship between level of depres-
sion and two cognitive processes, immediate recall and •wrd associations. 
Specifically, the study looked at the relationship between various levels 
of depression found naturally in a college population to the content 
of affect-laden recall, amount of total recall, ordering of recall, 
amount and content of interjections, and chain associations to neutral 
words. A significant relationship between level of depression and af-
fective content of immediate recall was found when college subjects 
scored on the extreme ends of the depression scale. There was some 
evidence that level of depression was related to the ordering or recall 
i.e., the Sad Mood and Learned Helplessness subscales on the MDI were 
related to the affect of the third group of words recalled. Three pos-
sible explanations were given for the study's failure to find more sig-
nificant relationships and for improving the procedure for future re-
search. The results of this study provided some support for Bower's 
associative network theory of emotions which conceptualizes emotion as 
a memory unit affecting cognitions. SpecificalJy, the results supported 
Bower's theory of mood-congruous memory. The implications of these re-
sults for cognitJve theories of depression were also discussed. 
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